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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE THE MATTER 
OF 
NELDA BOYER 
CASE NUMBER 16853 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
In its Anlicus Curiae Brief, the State concedes 
that involuntary guardianship limits the ward's fundamental 
civil rights, Amicus Curiae Brief of State of Utah at 5, but 
argues that both the substantive and procedural provisions 
found in the Utah Uniform Probate Code fully comport with 
constitutional mandates. Appellant vigorously disagrees. 
Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code 
Ann. §§75-1-101 et seq., an "incapacitated person means any 
person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental 
deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, 
chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause 
(except minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient 
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions 
concerning his person," §75-1-201 (18), allowing the court 
to appoint a guardian "if it is satisfied that the person ... is 
incapacitated and that the appointment is necessary or desirable 
as a means of providing continuing care and supervision .... " 
§75-5-304 (emphasis added). Unless specifically modified by 
the court, the guardian: has custody of the ward and establishes 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the ward's place of residence, §75-5-312(1) (a); has the 
right to define the ward's training and educational needs, 
id. at (1) (b) i determines the ward's need for medical and 
other professional care, id. at (1) (c); and in general "has 
the same powers, rights, and duties respecting his ward that 
a parent has respecting his unemancipated minor child .... " 
Id. at (1). According to the Utah Constitution, Art. IV §6: 
"No mentally incompetent person ... unless restored to civil 
rights, shall be permitted to vote at any election, or be 
eligible to hold office in this State." While no Utah case 
has construed the effect of the appointment of a guardian 
with respect to this constitutional provision, see, e.g., 
Home Town Finance Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 
72, 75-76 (1962), it is clear that the appointment of a 
guardian results in a massive curtailment of liberties for 
the ward. 
The controlling principle against which the guardianship 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code must be measured 
was well stated by this Court in In the Matter of the Guardianship 
of Valentine, 4 Utah 2d 355, 294 P.2d 696, 702 (1956): 
The right of every individual to handle his 
own affairs even at the expense of dissi-
pating his fortune is a right jealously 
guarded and one which will not be taken away 
except in extreme cases. 
Like Valentine, Appellant alleges that on the 
facts the appointment of a guardian for her was clearly 
erroneous. Unlike Valentine, however, she also challenges 
the constitutional validity of the cited statutes, which 
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fail to comport with the mandates of both procedural and 
substantive due process as well as equal protection. 
As a case of first impression in this Court, 
Appellant asks that the Court consider her allegations of 
factual error and constitutional insufficiency as hinging 
upon one another. While Appellant requests a reversal of 
the order appointing a guardian for her on every ground this 
Court deems appropriate, the Court will recognize that the 
factual errors in this case are based in large part upon 
statutes that operate to unnecessarily deprive individuals of 
their fundamental rights. The number of future appeals by 
others can be substantially diminished through the legislative 
enactment of guardianship laws which safeguard these rights. 
This Court has before it the opportunity to define the 
contours of constitutionality for subsequent enactments of 
the Utah Legislature relating to involuntary guardianship. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN ARE UNCON-
STITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(18), an incapacitated 
person must be unable to make "responsible decisions concerning 
his person." (emphasis added) The statute does not require 
that the alleged incapacitated person be unable to make any 
decisions, but only that such decisions as are made evidence 
a lack of responsibility. 
-3-
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This Court has specifically discarded "an unwillingness 
to or lack of interest in functioning, be the latter two 
ever so reprehensible as personal characteristics," In Re Heath, 
102 Utah 1, 126 P.2d 1058, 1061 (1942), as sufficient grounds 
for the appointment of a guardian. Yet the objective "responsible 
decision" standard would permit the appointment of a guardian 
for a functional person who makes decisions that pose no 
danger to anyone, including self, but are simply labelled 
"irresponsible" by others. 
An objective standard is inappropriate for de-
termining whether an individual is incapable 
of managing his person. Assessing an individual's 
personal management by comparing his behavior 
to normative standards carries the danger that 
courts will assert unnecessary control over the 
individual whose behavior is merely different 
from that of the majority. This danger is not 
a conjectural one. Recently, parents in several 
states have used conservatorship laws to legally 
abduct an adult son or daughter who has chosen to 
live with an unorthodox religious sect. "Depro-
gramming" procedures then divorce these indivi-
duals from their religious beliefs. Used in 
this manner, conservatorship may function as a 
weapon against those who reject conformity rather 
than as a service for those who need protection. 
Furthermore, because the objective standard 
compares the alleged incompetent's personal manage-
ment to ostensibly desirable personal management 
of a reasonable man, the standard tempts the trier 
of fact to prescribe what is "best" for an alleged 
incompetent even though that individual is capa-
ble of making decisions for himself. In affirm-
ing a conservatorship order, one state supreme 
court, for example, relied in part on expert 
testimony declaring that the best interests of . 
the alleged incompetent would be served by appoint-
ing a conservator, although the same expert 
testified that the alleged incompetent was able 
to decide what he did or did not desire. [In Re 
Schmidt's Guardianship, 221 Or. 535, 352 P.2d 152 
(1960)] 
-4-
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Note, Conservatorship of the Person, 1977 U. ILL. L. FORUM 
1113, 1121-22. While Appellant agrees with the State that 
guardianship is intended to confer benefits rather than 
extinguish rights, Amicus Brief, supra at 13, 
[e]xperience should teach us to be most on 
our guard to protect liberty when the 
government's purposes are beneficient .... 
The greatest dangers of liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding. 
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1938) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) . 
The "responsible decision" standard is not only 
"inappropriate," Conservatorship of the Person, supra, but 
constitutionally impermissible because it is vague. The 
difficulty with a vague standard is that "men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application [which] violates the first 
essential of due process of law." ·State v. Packard, 122 
Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952). A statutory standard 
must "be susceptible of uniform interpretation and application 
by those charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing 
it. " Id. , 2 5 0 P. 2d at 5 6 4. 
"The vice of unconstitutional vagueness is further 
aggravated where, as here, the statute in question operates 
to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively 
protected by the Constitution." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 
U.S. 360, 372 (1964). Appellant specifically lost the 
rights to establish a residence of her choosing and to set 
her own educational goals, Utah Code Ann. §75-5-312, both 
-5-
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rights jealously guarded as "essential to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness .... " Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
572 (1972) , and cases cited therein. 
The appointment of a guardian labels a person 
"irresponsible," if not wholly incompetent to manage one's 
affairs. A guardian is appointed for an indefinite period 
and during that period has the authority to establish the 
ward's need for medical or psychiatric treatment. In the 
context of civil commitment, the State has been constitutionally 
required to determine that persons are not only mentally ill 
and "unable to engage in a rational decision-making process," 
but also dangerous, before imposing involuntary treatment. 
Utah Code Ann. §64-7-36(10); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 
469 F. Supp. 424 (D.Utah 1979). While commitment can also 
be for an indefinite period of time, a civilly committed 
patient can be released from involuntary treatment by mental 
health facility staff, §§64-7-42 and 43, whereas an order of 
guardianship cannot be modified or vacated except by the 
court. §75-5-307. 
In light of this analogy, it is apparent that the 
appointment of a guardian is as onerous as civil commitment, 
yet a guardian is appointed merely because the ward is 
unable to make or communicate "responsible decisions concerning 
his person," and because the court is convinced a guardian 
is desirable as one means of providing "continuing care and 
supervision." Prior to 1979, Utah's civil commitment laws 
contained this same defect. The Utah federal court's Chief 
Judge wrote: 
-6-
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[T]he statute refers to "a responsible deci-
sion." This standard is sufficiently vague 
and overbroad to allow for a great deal of abuse. 
The use of the word "responsible" focuses the 
committing authority's attention on the content 
,of the decision rather than on the ability of 
the individual to engage in a rational decision-
making process. The word "responsible," being 
given no further content, lends itself to a com-
pletely subjective and, therefore, potentially 
arbitrary and nonuniform, evaluation of what is 
decided rather than an objective evaluation of 
the method by which the decision is reached. 
Colyar, supra at 433 (original emphasis). The court noted 
that under this standard a particular state court judge was 
free to determine whether or not a decision was "responsible." 
The use of a vague standard to find a person 
incapacitated and in need of guardianship may once have been 
constitutionally permissible, but "times and conditions may 
change so that it might be adjudged to be unconstitutional .... " 
Stone v. Dept. of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah 1977). 
Unless a statute affords freedom from arbitrary action, it 
cannot satisfy the requirements of substantive due process. 
Mineer v. Bd. of Review of Industrial Conun., 572 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (Utah 1977). 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE APPOINT-
MENT OF A GUARDIAN ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
OVERBROAD. 
This Court has long recognized that personal 
liberty is highly prized: 
The right to be free from restraint of one's 
person is one of the most fundamental and 
cherished of freedoms. It is the policy of 
the law to afford it the highest degree of pro-
tection possible consistent with the rights 
of others. 
-7-
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Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458, 459 (1962). Where 
"the rights of others" are as minimal as they are here, "the 
highest degree of protection" is all the more applicable. 
Legislation is unconstitutionally overbroad when 
it is susceptible to prohibiting conduct protected by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 
292, 153 P.2d 647, 652 (1944), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 
829 (1945). Even if the "responsible decision" standard 
were clear and precise, a valid use of the State's parens 
patriae authority may not sweep unnecessarily broadly to 
appoint guardians for functional persons. Cf. Zwickler 
v. Keota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). Where fundamental and cheri~hed 
freedoms are at stake, the State must employ the least 
drastic means available, most especially where the paramount 
concern is for the person of the ward. Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
The State argues that Utah's guardianship laws are 
not overbroad because of the flexibility allowed a court in 
determining the powers of a guardian. Amicus Brief, supra 
at 10. Appellant agrees that flexibility is appropriate, 
but, even so, she maintains that these statutes fail to 
comport with the principles cited above, for two reasons. 
First, whatever flexibility is afforded a court is dependent 
upon a finding that the proposed ward is unable to make or 
communicate responsible decisions, a threshold too uncertain 
and flimsy to afford adequate protection. The provision for 
-8-
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finding the appointment "desirable" adds nothing. While Appellant 
agrees that incapacity may stem from myriad causes which cannot 
all be statutorily defined, §75-1-201(18), by listing specific 
reasons for incapacity yet allowing for "other cause," provides 
a court no additional guidance as to the level of impairment 
necessary for appointment of a guardian. For insofar as 
Utah's guardianship scheme fails to limit deprivations of 
autonomy according to the proposed ward's proven needs, the 
scheme violates the least restrictive alternative principle 0 
and must be struck down. See infra at Point III. 
Second, the existence and/or sufficiency of particular 
dispositions available to the court is not at issue in this 
case. The legislature may provide for flexibility in sentencing 
criminal defendants, for example, yet the elements of the 
offense charged are set according to rigorous standards. 
The same is true in cases of civil commitment and deprivation 
of parental rights. The informality of such proceedings as 
these does not permit the abridgement of basic constitutional 
provisions of due process. State in the Interest of S-J-, 576 
P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978). 
In examining the constitutionality of the guardianship 
laws, this Court recognizes it is "not primarily concerned 
with the wisdom, desirability or expediency of the law, but 
with the question as to whether it violates constitutional 
guarantees." Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 110 P.2d 355, 
J 
363 (1941). The fact that the proposed ward may be incapacitated 
and in need of "continuing care and supervision," Utah Code 
Ann. §75-5-304, is insufficient reason to force the person 
to accept a guardian. 
-9-
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It might be argued that the individual 
interest is less fundamental or less impor-
tant when one is dealing with a person of 
diminished capacity because the person lacks 
the ability to make meaningful choices. If the 
individual interest is less fundamental, then, the 
argument goes, the state's interest may be less 
compelling. But this argument sweeps too broadly. 
Whether an interest is fundamental depends not 
on the depth of individual appreciation of the 
interest at stake, but on whether or not the right 
is protected by the Constitution. San Antonio 
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
30-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); 
"Developments [in the Law, Civil Commitment of 
the Mentally Ill," 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190,] supra 
at 1211 n. 6 . 
.... An individual's diminished capacity should 
not and does not affect the protection owed him 
when the state attempts to deprive him of his 
liberty. 
Colyar, supra at 430. 
Not only does the ward lose the right to make 
residential, occupational, educational, and other basic 
decisions; further, the guardian's control may violate the 
ward's free exercise of religious beliefs. In Holmes v. 
Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D.Ill. 
1972), the court held: 
The state-appointed conservator's ordering of 
medical treatment in violation of his religious 
beliefs, no matter how well-intentioned the conser-
vator may be, violates the First Amendment's free-
dom of exercise clause in the absence of some sub-
stantial state interest. 
If the definition of incapacitated person for whom 
a guardian may be appointed is overbroad, some narrowly-
defined class of persons for whom guardians can constitutionally 
be appointed must exist. compare the Utah definitions with 
those used in the Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act 
-10-
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prepared by the American Bar Association's Commission on the 
Mentally Disabled, reprinted at 3 MENTAL DIS. L. REP. 264, 
266-67 (1979): 
Section 3. Definitions 
As used in this act: 
(2) "Disabled persons" means adults whose 
ability to receive and evaluate information 
effectively and/or to communicate decisions is 
impaired to such an extent that they lack the 
capacity to manage their financial resources and/ 
or to meet essential requirements for their 
physical health or safety even with court-
ordered assistance or the appointment of a limited 
personal guardian or limited conservator. 
(4) "Meet essential requirements for phy-
sical health or safety" means those actions neces-
sary to provide the health care, food, shelter, 
clothing, personal hygiene and other care without 
which serious physical injury or illness is more 
likely than not to occur. 
(Because the case at bar contests only Utah's laws for 
guardianship of the person, the separate sections defining 
lack of capacity to "manage financial resources"--provisions 
for conservatorship of the estate--are omitted.) 
Utah's definition of incapacity contains none of 
the requirements of the Model Act that the proposed ward 
pose a danger to self. Utah Code Ann. §75-5-304 does require 
that the court find the appointment of a guardian "necessary 
or desirable as a means of providing continuing care and 
supervision of the person of the incapacitated person," but 
a lack of care and supervision need not rise to the level of 
personal dangerousness. Nor does the present statute require 
that the appointment of a guardian be the only means of 
providing care and supervision. 
-11-
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The concept that a person must pose a danger to 
self before a compelling State interest in intervention 
arises has received a fair amount of judicial atten~ion. 
If an individual is able to provide basic 
care for himself and is not otherwise a danger 
to himself or others, the legitimacy of the state's 
interest is called into serious question. The 
parens patriae power is premised on the state's 
interest in caring for those who cannot care for 
themselves. If an individual can care for him-
self, alone or with the help of family or friends, 
the rationale behind the parens patriae power 
fails. 
Colyar, supra at 431; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U.S. 563 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown State School 
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). And 
In Re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C.Ct. App. 1979), held that the 
guardian of even an adjudicated incompetent person could not 
freely make decisions affecting the ward absent a life-or-
death situation. 
In sum, the present Utah statutes broadly apply to 
allow the appointment of a guardian for persons, like Appellant, 
who pose no danger to anyone, including themselves, but who 
make decisions that others consider inappropriate. In this 
respect the District Court's decision fully complied with an 
unconstitutional statutory scheme: the facts adduced at the 
hearing permitted guardianship over a person capable of 
managing her own affairs. Her decisions might be irresponsible 
to some, yet individual choice is determined not by "the 
vote of the majority," but by "the singular situation viewed 
from the unique perspective of the person called on to make 
the decision." Saikewicz, supra, 370 N.E.2d at 428. 
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POINT III. 
THE STATUTES FAIL TO REQUIRE APPLICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF LEAST 
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE. 
In the context of civil commitment, a Utah court 
must find a person: (1) mentally ill, (2) dangerous to self 
or others, (3) unable to engage in a rational decision-
making process regarding hospitalization, (4) can receive 
adequate and appropriate treatment in a mental health facility, 
and (5) cannot be effectively helped by a less restrictive 
alternative, before ordering the person hospitalized. Utah 
Code Ann. §64-7-36(10}. Once the order of hospitalization 
is entered, however, mental health facility staff have 
complete flexibility to formulate treatment plans that meet 
the patient's needs. 
In guardianship proceedings, all dispositions flow 
from findings of irresponsible decisionmaking and the desirability 
of guardianship. Moreover, under §75-5-312, the guardian's 
authority is automatically plenary, "except as modified by 
the court." However, the statutes nowhere require that 
different findings be made for alternative dispositions. 
Even if a person is completely unable to engage in a rational 
decision-making process, that person is not civilly committable 
on those grounds alone; yet that same person can suffer the 
deprivations of guardianship for failure to engage in responsible 
decisionmaking--and nothing else. The proposed ward's 
individual level of need for guardianship in specific areas 
need not be scrutinized under the present Utah law. 
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Appellant does not suggest that the criteria for 
appointment of a guardian should be identical to those for 
civil commitment. Appellant does maintain that the scope of 
the guardian's authority must be both compelled and limited 
strictly by the necessity for depriving the ward of autonomy 
in those areas. 
The American Bar Association, which originally 
approved the Uniform Probate Code in 1969, has issued a 
statement of the Code's shortcomings. The ABA now believes 
that the Code lacks a number of essential elements: 
(1) Assessment of actual mental and adap-
tive limitations of the person needing assis-
tance or protection. 
(2) Court finding of lack of capacity 
to do specific kinds of tasks or to make speci-
fic kinds of decisions. 
(3) Court order of limited guardianship which 
specifies those legal disabilities to be im-
posed and grants only those powers the guardian 
will need in order to act where a legal disability 
has been specified. 
ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Limited Guardianships 
for the Mentally Disabled, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE RE,V. 231, 232 
(1978). 
Guardianship laws must require application of the 
least restrictive alternative for at least two reasons. 
First is the broad range of factual contexts 
to which the principle has been applied. · The 
doctrine itself, as generally enunciated by 
the Supreme Court, seems broad enough to encom-
pass any situation in which fundamental personal 
liberties are infringed upon by government regula-
tions promulgated in pursuit of legitimate state 
objectives. Second, the concept has already 
been applied in cases involving the analogous 
situation of the involuntary institutionalization 
and habilitation of the mentally disabled. 
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Comment, Interdiction Reform: The Need for a Limited Interdiction 
Article in the Louisiana Civil Code, 54 TULANE L. REV. 164, 
184 (1979). The article concludes that the extension of the 
least restrictive alternative principle to guardianship 
proceedings is constitutionally required. 
POINT IV. 
A HIGH EVIDENTIARY STANDARD DOES NOT 
CURE SUBSTANTIVE DEFECTS. 
Appellant agrees with the State that the "satisfaction" 
standard of proof is equated with the standard of clear and 
convincing evidence. Amicus Brief, supra atlB-19. However, 
the State's averment that "the individual is protected from 
any possible vagueness in definition by the requirement that 
the judge must be presented with clear and convincing evidence" 
is blatently incorrect. This same allegation was raised in 
Colyar, supra at 433, where the relevant standard of proof 
was beyond a reasonable doubt. If the State's argument is 
persuasive here, it should have been all the more persuasive 
where the standard was even higher. But the court said: 
The defendant urges that any ambiguity 
in the statute is cured by the fact that the 
state must prove all the statutory elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of 
proof is a stringent one, and does work to 
provide protection for the person facing in-
voluntary commitment. The protection afforded 
is, however, from the risk of factual error, 
not from the risk of commitment under an overly 
broad or unduly vague statute. In Re Ballay 
[ 15 7 u. s. App. D. c. 5 9 I 4 8 2 F. 2d 6 4 8 , ] 6 5 0 
[(1973)]. The statute does provide that a person 
not be committed unless the state shows beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he can be validly confined. 
However, the statute does not make sufficiently 
precise the criteria by which a state can validly 
commit. If it is not clear what has to be 
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or if what must 
be proven is too broad in character, the standard 
of proof applied is irrelevant. No matter how 
high the standard, the due process problem of 
what must be proven remains. 
POINT V. 
STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY APPLIES. 
The State argues that strict judicial scrutiny of 
the statutory criteria need not be applied by this Court but 
only by claiming that "the Utah involuntary guardianship 
statute can pass even the strict scrutiny test ... [so that] 
there is no question that the Utah statute is not [sic] 
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose." Amicus 
Brief, supra at 9. The State admits that restrictions on 
basic personal rights demand strict scrutiny, id. at 8, but 
then curiously considers only the "suspect class" basis for_) 
strict scrutiny and concludes that because the class of 
involuntary wards is not one usually labelled "suspect" by 
the United States Supreme Court, that Court would not apply 
strict scrutiny. Both the State and Appellant agree that 
fundamental rights are at stake in involuntary guardianship 
proceedings. When: 
[T]he classification at issue here signifi-
cantly interferes with the exercise of that [fun-
damental] right, we believe that "critical 
examination" of the state interests advanced in 
support of the classification is required. 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (overturning 
Wisconsin's requirement that an ex-spouse guarantee the 
continuance of child support obligations before being allowed 
to remarry). The State's citation to Trimble v. Gordon,430 
U.S. 762 (1977), is inapposite because there neither was the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
class of illegitimate children "suspect," nor were fundamental 
rights implicated. 
This Court has already recognized the necessity 
for strict judicial scrutiny when basic personal liberties 
are at stake. Mildon, supra. Strict scrutiny calls for the 
State to show a compelling interest in the guardianship 
statutes as written. See Zablocki, supra. When the statutes 
reasonably assure that no individual will be unnecessarily 
deprived of fundamental liberties, then the factfinding of 
individual guardianship proceedings will comport with constitutional 
mandates. 
CONCLUSION 
As the State cannot now show that proper applica-
tion of the Utah statutes will result in the appointment of 
guardians for only those persons who require protection 
because dangerous and bereft of mental capacity, the statutory 
scheme must fail. 
DATED this c v day of ~&J. ' 1980. 
---=-----
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